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Is there progress in philosophy? If so, how much?
Philosophers have recently argued for a wide range of
answers to these questions, from the view that there is
no progress whatsoever to the view that philosophy has
provided answers to all the big philosophical questions.
However, these views are difficult to compare and eval-
uate, because they rest on very different assumptions
about the conditions under which philosophy would
make progress. This paper looks to the comparatively
mature debate about scientific progress for inspiration
on how to formulate four distinct accounts of philo-
sophical progress, in terms of truthlikeness, problem-
solving, knowledge, and understanding. Equally impor-
tantly, the paper outlines a common framework for how
to understand and evaluate these accounts. We distill
a series of lessons from this exercise, to help pave the
way for a more fruitful discussion about philosophical
progress in the future.
1 INTRODUCTION
Is there progress in philosophy? Is there enough of it? Recently, various versions of these questions
have been raised and vigorously debated. Proffered answers range from the darkest pessimism, on
which there is no progress in philosophy whatsoever (e.g., Dietrich, 2011), to the brightest opti-
mism, on which philosophy has provided answers to all the big questions (e.g., Cappelen, 2017).
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In between, there are moderate pessimists, who contend that philosophy hasmade some progress
but not as much as we would like or see in the sciences (e.g., Chalmers, 2015), and moderate
optimists, who argue that philosophy has made about as much progress as could reasonably be
expected (e.g., Stoljar, 2017).
Unfortunately, these views are difficult to compare and evaluate, because they rest on differ-
ent assumptions about the conditions under which philosophy makes progress. This difficulty
is compounded by the fact that these assumptions often remain tacit. Surveying the literature in
search of a general definition of philosophical progress, on the basis of which one could systemati-
cally estimate whether and howmuch philosophical progress has beenmade, reveals a surprising
lack of explicit proposals. What we find instead is a gerrymandered collection of merely suffi-
cient conditions—proposed by optimists to show that there is more progress than we might have
thought—and merely necessary conditions—proposed by pessimists to show that there is less.
The door is open, then, for optimists to celebrate achievements that pessimists do not deny, while
pessimists decry limitations that optimists are happy to accept.
In short, we lack common ground on which to stand as we evaluate whether (and the extent
to which) philosophy has made progress. Such a shared backdrop is also required to evaluate
and discuss how best to facilitate philosophical progress in the future. In particular, the notion
of progress should guide our decisions regarding where to devote our intellectual and financial
resources, and shed light on which methods we should use in philosophy.1
What we need, then, is a general account of the nature of philosophical progress: preferably, a
set of necessary and sufficient conditions for progress. More fundamentally, we need a common
frameworkwithin which accounts of philosophical progress can be proposed and evaluated. This
paper aims to provide such a framework. We articulate four broad approaches to developing an
account of philosophical progress which could serve both as templates and as common ground
in debates between pessimists and optimists, along with a set of distinctions and concepts that
help to clarify and evaluate these accounts. To be clear, our aim is not to argue in favor of any
particular account—or, by implication, to defend optimism or pessimism. Rather, our aim is to
lay the groundwork for a more constructive and systematic debate about philosophical progress
moving forward.
The framework we propose is not created ex nihilo. In the philosophy of science, there is now a
mature debate about the nature of scientific progress stretching back to Popper (1963) and Kuhn
(1970). Four competing accounts have garnered the most attention, which respectively define sci-
entific progress in terms of truthlikeness, problem-solving, knowledge, and understanding. Impor-
tantly, these accounts are formulated and debated within a common framework that has grad-
ually emerged over several decades of philosophical discussion. This paper seeks to extend this
framework for thinking about scientific progress, and the most influential accounts therein, to
the topic of philosophical progress. Motivated by the fact that pessimists and optimists alike fre-
quently compare philosophical progress to scientific progress,2 we take it as aworking assumption
that the debate about philosophical progress can be advanced by looking to the debate about sci-
entific progress.
With these thoughts in mind, we will articulate the framework underpinning debates about
scientific progress and draw from it several lessons for debates about philosophical progress. For
example, we argue that whether and the extent to which persistent disagreement or lack of con-
vergence between philosophers’ views is the basis of a convincing argument for pessimism—as
many pessimists claim or assume (e.g., Chalmers, 2015)—largely depends on which account of
philosophical progress is adopted.While persistent disagreement presents a straightforward chal-
lenge for progress on some knowledge-based accounts, it is less clear that disagreement as such
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undermines progress on accounts that eschew justification requirements on philosophical
progress. Similarly, one of Stoljar’s (2017) central arguments for amoderate optimism about philo-
sophical progress (‘reasonable optimism’) rests heavily on the idea that solving certain kinds of
problems is in itself sufficient for progress. However, as we discuss below, Stoljar’s argument that
the way philosophers typically solve problems is progressive would benefit from drawing upon
resources and distinctions developed in the service of theorizing about scientific progress.
We proceed as follows. In §2, we survey the most prominent views and arguments concerning
philosophical progress in the recent literature. In §3, we turn to four influential accounts of sci-
entific progress and the framework in which they have been proposed, and then formulate four
analogous accounts of philosophical progress. In §4,we distill a series of lessons from this exercise,
to help pave the way for a more fruitful discussion about philosophical progress in the future.
2 THE DEBATE ABOUT PHILOSOPHICAL PROGRESS
There has been a recent surge of interest in whether, and the extent to which, philosophy makes
progress. Inwhat follows, we highlight various stances that have been taken, and take a closer look
at a recurring theme, viz. that persistent lack of agreement or convergence between philosophers
undermines philosophical progress.
2.1 Pessimism about philosophical progress
In general, pessimism about philosophical progress holds that philosophy has either made no
progress at all, or not ‘enough’ relative to some specified benchmark, such as the progress of var-
ious successful sciences. Arguments for pessimism tend to follow a common schema, where (i)
some allegedly necessary condition for philosophical progress is identified, (ii) it is then argued
that this condition has not been satisfied, or not been satisfied to a sufficient extent, finally (iii) it
is concluded that philosophy has not made progress, or has not made ‘enough’ of it.
The most commonly cited necessary condition is agreement between philosophers about the
answers to philosophical questions, or, relatedly, collective convergence on such answers over
time.3 The alleged necessity of agreement or convergence for progress is made explicit by, among
others, Rescher (2014), and Chalmers (2015). These philosophers then describe what they take to
be an empirical reality, namely that contemporary philosophy continues to grapple with ancient
questions—from questions about what is morally obligatory to questions about the relation
betweenmind and body—and yet it seems that philosophers have still not reached any consensus
about how to answer these questions. Instead, we see a proliferation of theories, including those
that explore entirely new logical space and those that tweak and amend prior theories in increas-
ingly fine-grained ways. With so many different and mutually exclusive theories endorsed by
philosophers,many have been prompted to doubt that philosophymakes any, or enough, progress.
To substantiate the impression that collective convergence on philosophical questions is rare,
Chalmers (2015) cites the 2009 PhilPapers survey of more than 450 professional philosophers’
views regarding key philosophical questions and positions (cf. Bourget & Chalmers, 2014). On 23
of the 30 questions, the most commonly held view is endorsed by less than 60% of respondents
(Chalmers, 2015, 9). According toChalmers, this apparent lack of consensus indicates thatwehave
not made enough progress, leading him to endorse a moderate form of pessimism on which there
is less progress in philosophy than we would like—and, in particular, less progress than in the
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‘hard’ sciences (Chalmers, 2015, 4).4 Other pessimists draw a more extreme conclusion from this
lack of convergence: philosophy does not make progress at all. Horwich (2012, 34), for instance,
bemoans philosophy’s “embarrassing failure, after over two thousand years, to settle any of its
central questions.”5
Why exactly would a lack of agreement or convergence undermine philosophical progress?
Although arguments to this effect are not always spelled out explicitly, some authors (e.g.,
Chalmers, 2015; see also Cappelen, 2017) suggest that one reason stems from the way in which
some kinds of philosophical disagreement appear to undermine knowledge. The thought seems
to be that if sufficiently many of my philosophical ‘peers’—i.e., philosophers who are (roughly)
equally competent reasoners and (roughly) equally aswell informed as I am—disagreewithme on
a particular philosophical issue, I would as a result be unjustified in believing my own views to be
correct. And mutatis mutandis for my philosophical peers, provided that there are enough other
peers who, like me, disagree with them. The upshot would be that our philosophical beliefs on
that issue would not constitute knowledge,6 from which it might be inferred that no progress has
been made with regard to this philosophical issue. This would be the case regardless of whether
any of these views are in fact correct or supported by first-order philosophical arguments, since
the higher-order evidence of pervasive peer disagreement would undermine knowledge even in
that case. Of course, one can resist this argument by adopting a view of peer disagreement on
which it does not undermine knowledge, or by arguing that disagreements among philosophers
rarely qualify as peer disagreement because of the stringent requirements on epistemic peerhood
(see, e.g., Elga, 2007; King, 2011). More importantly for our purposes is to note that this argument
assumes a tight connection between progress and knowledge—which is denied by most accounts
of scientific progress. (We will return to this point below.)
A closely related argument proceeds from the premise that philosophical problems and theories
do not seem to disappear from serious consideration in the way that scientific theories regularly
do (e.g., Dietrich, 2011; Jones, 2017; Slezak, 2018; Sterba, 2004). While no serious physicist would
endorse Aristotelian physics, for example, many philosophers still endorse versions of Aristotle’s
philosophical theses. A similar worry is that what appear to be new philosophical arguments, the-
ories and debates in fact closely resemble the philosophical arguments, theories and debates of the
past. As Arthur Lovejoy (1917, 126-127) describes the phenomenon in his 1916 presidential address
to the American Philosophical Association, “the speculative fashion of one generation becomes a
discredited error to the next, and returns to vogue (perhaps with the air of a new discovery) in a
third.”
Various other arguments for pessimism are worth mentioning despite being less influential.
McGinn (1993) argues that while philosophical problems are in principle solvable, evolution has
not endowed humans with the psychological capacity to solve them. Mironov (2013) argues that
philosophical progress is impossible, since the very point of philosophy is to articulate different
and even conflicting interpretations of phenomena as opposed to converging on a set of common
views. Yet another strand of pessimistic argument attacks the prevalence of a priori philosophical
methods, contending that philosophy has not made sufficient progress because the methods that
are typically used are not conducive to reliably discovering the truth (Sytsma & Livengood, 2012).
2.2 Optimism about philosophical progress
Optimism about philosophical progress holds that philosophy has either made outstanding
progress, or at least ‘enough’—again, relative to some benchmark, such as the progress of
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various successful sciences. Since optimism is thus roughly the negation of pessimism, the pri-
mary argumentative strategy of optimists has been to rebut the arguments of pessimists.
In response to pessimistic arguments from a lack of convergence to a lack of progress, some
optimists argue that there is considerably more convergence than pessimists have assumed (e.g.,
Frances, 2017; Stoljar, 2017). One way to substantiate this response consists in pointing out that
philosophical debate encourages us to focus our attention on the philosophical theses we disagree
on, while less controversial theses are passed by in silence precisely because there is less interest
in debating theses on which there is no disagreement (Frances, 2017, 52).7 Others deny that agree-
ment or collective convergence is necessary for progress (e.g., Bengson et al., 2019; Brock, 2017;
Cappelen, 2017). For example, Cappelen (2017) rejects the threat of disagreement for progress,
likening the search for philosophical truth to the search for a golden coin in a haystack. So long
as one of us finds the coin, we can say that we have found the coin. By analogy, so long as one of
us comes to know some philosophical truth, we can say that we have collectively come to know
that truth.
Other (moderate) optimists about philosophical progress emphasize that ‘big’ philosophical
problems can be solved and have been solved (e.g., Rapaport, 1982; Stoljar, 2017). For example,
Stoljar (2017, 55-56) suggests that it has been established and generally agreed upon that not all
facts about meaning are necessitated by behavioral facts. According to Stoljar, this solves Quine’s
problem of the indeterminacy ofmeaning since that problem consists in determiningwhich claim
to reject in the following inconsistent triad which he calls a ‘boundary problem’ (Stoljar, 2017,
47):
(a) There are facts about meaning.
(b) If there are facts about meaning, all such facts are necessitated by behavioral facts.
(c) If there are facts about meaning, not all such facts are necessitated by behavioral facts.
By Stoljar’s lights, rejecting (b) counts as a solution to Quine’s problem. Other ‘big’ problems of
philosophy have been solved in an exactly analogous way, viz. by rejecting a ‘boundary thesis’
claiming that all facts of one kind are facts of some other kind.
Significantly, among the optimists we find a rare attempt to define the concept of philosophical
progress. Stoljar (2017, 25) suggests that there is progress in philosophy if and only if “the questions
of philosophy or suitably related questions have been answered in the past and it is reasonable
to suppose that such questions will be answered in the future.” While we will say more about
Stoljar’s suggestion in §4, for now it is worth noting that one of his primary contributions to the
debate between optimists and pessimists is to argue that the latter fail to distinguish philosophical
problems at a sufficiently fine grain. In one of his twomain arguments for optimism, Stoljar leans
heavily on the case of Descartes’ mind-body problem which, he contends, is not the same as the
mind-body problemwe grapplewith today.While the latter problem remains unsolved, the former
problem is solved—and indeed there is widespread consensus on its solution. The fact that we
are dealing with a ‘successor problem’ with the very same name leads people to falsely suppose
that we are still grappling with, and disagreeing about, the very same as-yet-unsolved mind-body
problem. Stoljar argues that similar thoughts apply to many philosophical problems. Thus he
concludes that upon closer examination, many of the problems with which we grapple today are
not identical to problems posed in the past, and indeed that there is convergence on the solutions
to many past problems.
Several themes emerge from the above discussion. First, the prevalence of philosophical
progress is frequently compared to the prevalence of scientific progress. Second, many pessimists,
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and even some optimists, have taken there to be a quite strong connection between philosophical
progress and convergence between philosophers’ views, or lack thereof (i.e., persistent disagree-
ment). Third, there has been thought to be some connection between progress and answering
philosophical questions or solving philosophical problems. However, without a shared framework
within which to evaluate the precise nature of these connections it is hard to see how we might
go about doing so.
3 FROM SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS TO PHILOSOPHICAL PROGRESS
In what follows, we will suggest an approach to building the requisite framework which draws
heavily upon the debate about scientific progress. This will come as no surprise to those who
accept Quine’s (1957, 1981) dictum that philosophy is continuous with science, in which case it is
highly doubtful that there would be any substantial differences between scientific and philosoph-
ical progress. Indeed, the fact that science and philosophy are both forms of inquiry—and that
science can inform philosophy and vice versa—suggests they have at least some aims in common,
even if they pursue these aims in different ways. Most importantly, both pessimists and optimists
frequently compare the extent of philosophical progress to the extent of scientific progress.8 Such
quantitative comparisons would make little sense if these two notions of progress were funda-
mentally different, since there would then be no common measure relative to which philosophy
could be said to make more or less progress than science (or indeed the same amount).
To be clear, none of this is to assume that that science and philosophy are alike in all respects.
For example, if (and to the extent that) philosophy and science investigate different subject mat-
ters, it is to be expected that they will use different methods to make progress. However, a stark
methodological difference between science and philosophy is entirely compatible with a uniform
account of progress across these disciplines. Moreover, even those who take philosophical and sci-
entific progress to be fundamentally different have a lot to learn from our suggestions below for
how to develop accounts of philosophical progress by analogywith accounts of scientific progress.
For them, an account of progress that is implausible for science may be plausible for philosophy
(and vice versa), so they may choose to accept an account of philosophical progress that is analo-
gous to one of the accounts of scientific progress that they reject. Importantly, those who embrace
this approach must give up on comparing the extent of philosophical and scientific progress.
We first introduce four dominant accounts of scientific progress (§3.1); thenwe outline the com-
mon framework that has emerged for debating these accounts (§3.2); before finally formulating
philosophical counterparts of these accounts (§3.3).
3.1 Accounts of scientific progress
According to what is widely considered to be a naïve view of scientific progress (e.g., Dellsén,
2018b; Niiniluoto, 2019), science makes progress when true theories are proposed and accepted.
This naïve view quickly loses its appeal when we look at the history of science. Not all false the-
ories are equal, and some episodes whereby one false theory is replaced with another look to be
progressive. Despite being false, the successor theory is nonetheless often an improvement on its
predecessor. For example, Niels Bohr’s model of the atom on which negatively-charged electrons
orbit a much more massive positively-charged nucleus with fixed radii is, strictly speaking, false.
Yet Bohr’smodel was clearly an improvement on the previous ‘plum pudding’model, proposed by
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J.J. Thomson, according towhich the electronswere evenly distributedwithin a positively charged
area or substrate (as plums in a pudding).
Recognition of this clear shortcoming of the naïve view has given rise to a systematic philo-
sophical exploration of the nature of scientific progress, which arguably began in earnest with
Popper’s influential falsificationist program in which the concept of ‘verisimilitude’ plays a major
role (Popper, 1959, 1963). Roughly speaking, verisimilitude—or truthlikeness, as it is now standardly
called—is meant to measure the extent to which a given theory captures the whole truth about
some topic or phenomenon, or even the entire world. Truthlikeness is not identical to the more
familiar concept of approximate truth, even when the latter is understood as a gradable notion,
since a theorymay be highly approximately true of some phenomenon and yet be very uninforma-
tive. By contrast, a highly truthlike theory is one that balances informativeness and approximation
to the truth. For example, compare the theory that the Earth is not flat to the theory that the Earth
is a sphere. The former is more approximately true (indeed, it is fully true) than the latter (which
is strictly speaking false) but the latter is more truthlike since it is far more informative.
Popper proposed an account of scientific progress in terms of his notion of verisimilitude (i.e.,
truthlikeness), and this idea was subsequently developed in great detail by Niiniluoto (1980, 1984,
1987, 2014) and others (Cevolani & Tambolo, 2013; Kuipers, 2009; see also Oddie, 1986). This is the
truthlikeness account of scientific progress.While details differ between particular formulations of
the account—depending primarily on how to define the somewhat elusive notion of truthlikeness
in the most plausible way—they share the core idea that scientific progress occurs between t1
and t2 precisely when the scientific theories accepted at t2 are more truthlike than those that
were accepted at t1.9 In Niiniluoto’s version of the truthlikeness account—which may be seen as
canonical at this point—the truthlikeness of a scientific theory T is defined relative to a language
L as a measure of the similarity between a maximally specific claim 𝐶∗ in L, that fully captures
everything that is true, and a disjunction of other such maximally specific claims (𝐶1 ∨ … ∨ 𝐶𝑛)
that captures the content of T by effectively listing all the maximally specific possible states of
affairs allowed by T.
Until relatively recently, the most influential alternative to the truthlikeness account was an
explicitly anti-realist account initially suggested by Kuhn (1970) and developed in detail by Lau-
dan (1977, 1981; see also Shan, 2019). The key notion behind this account of scientific progress
is that of scientific problems,10 which divide into empirical problems (questions concerning the
objects or entities that a particular scientific theory is meant to explain or account for) and con-
ceptual problems (questions about the theories themselves or how they relate to other theories).
Importantly, there is no fixed or objectively correct set of scientific problems; rather, what counts
as a scientific problem is determined by the research tradition11 that is dominant among scientists
in a given discipline at a given time. Thus if a particular question constitutes a problem relative to
the (perhaps mistaken) assumptions of scientists working within a particular research tradition,
then it is a problem relative to that research tradition. Indeed, there is no requirement here that a
‘problem’ in this sense rest on correct assumptions; thus some of the ‘problems’ of past research
traditions will seem entirely spurious when viewed in retrospect.
With this notion of a scientific problem in hand, the problem-solving account of scientific
progress simply defines progress as a decrease over time in the number and importance of
the unsolved problems within a research tradition. Thus there are in effect two ways to make
progress according to the problem-solving account: on the one hand, scientists make progress by
answering—to their own satisfaction, as determined by the research tradition—a question that
constitutes an empirical or conceptual problem for them; on the other hand, progress can also
be made by scientists dismissing or downgrading a question’s importance—by their lights, as
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determined by the research tradition. As an example of the latter, consider that accounting for
the apparent action-at-a-distance involved in gravitational interactions was considered to be an
important conceptual problem in pre-Newtonian physics, only to be dismissed within the subse-
quent Newtonian paradigm. According to the problem-solving account, this constituted progress
no less than Einstein’s later solution to the problem in which gravitational interactions are medi-
ated by the curvature of space-time itself.
A third, more recent, account of scientific progress is the epistemic account developed by Bird
(2007, 2008, 2016). According to this account, scientific progress occurs if and only if there is accu-
mulation of knowledge, i.e., the addition of new knowledge to what is already known in science.
This implies that adopting a new theory only counts as progressive if our epistemic state with
regard to that theory satisfies all of the necessary conditions for knowledge. So on this account,
progress consists in accumulating theories that are, minimally, true,12 believed, and in some sense
epistemically justified. Here, epistemic justification may be understood internalistically, e.g., in
terms of support from evidence to which the agent has direct access, or externalistically, e.g., in
terms of reliability, safety, and/or sensitivity. On many accounts of epistemic justification (espe-
cially of the internalist variety), not every justified true belief is knowledge (Gettier, 1963), so accu-
mulating justified true beliefs may not always be sufficient for progress on the epistemic account;
but since Gettier cases are relatively rare this complication can often be ignored (although there
may be exceptions; see Barnes, 1991, 317; Bird, 2016, 554-559).
A key difference between Bird’s epistemic account and competing accounts of scientific
progress concerns the requirement that accumulating theories be epistemically justified. Bird
argues that this is an advantage by considering hypothetical cases where scientists come to believe
a true theory that isn’t adequately supported by scientific evidence, and so fails to be justified.
According to Bird, the truthlikeness account implies the intuitively incorrect verdict that such
cases would be progressive; whereas the epistemic account correctly implies that they would not
be. Bird’s argument has been repeatedly challenged (e.g., Cevolani&Tambolo, 2013; Dellsén, 2016;
Niiniluoto, 2014; Rowbottom, 2008, 2010), and the intuition on which it rests does not appear to
be particularly widespread (Mizrahi & Buckwalter, 2014). We are not concerned with settling this
dispute here; rather, we merely note that it is a major bone of contention in the recent debate
about scientific progress whether progress requires epistemic justification in the sense required
for knowledge.
A fourth and final account of scientific progress is the noetic account developed by Dellsén
(2016, 2018a, forthcoming; 2015; Goebel, 2019; Potochnik, 2017). According to this account,making
scientific progresswith regard to somephenomenon amounts to gaining or improving our abilities
to correctly explain or predict it. To illustrate, the noetic account implies that scientists make
progress on COVID-19, for example, whenever they become better able to explain the disease or
predict its behavior—e.g., by discoveringmore about its causes ormodeling its future spreadmore
accurately. Dellsén characterizes this type of cognitive achievement as increased understanding of
the phenomenon in question.However, the nature of understanding ismuch debated. Indeed, one
view on offer is that understanding reduces to a type of knowledge.13 Pairing this reductionist view
of understanding with an understanding-based account of scientific progress would simply be a
more demanding version of the epistemic account, on which not all accumulations of knowledge
constitute progress. Dellsén’s noetic account, however, explicitly defines understanding such that
it doesn’t reduce to a type of knowledge, or even require epistemic justification (Dellsén, 2016,
2017). Thus, scientific progress can be made in the absence of epistemic justification on Dellsén’s
noetic account.
DELLSÉN et al. 9
Since the noetic account requires explanations and predictions to be correct in order for one’s
coming to grasp them to be an increase in understanding, it is a broadly factive account of scientific
progress. In this respect, the noetic account differs from the problem-solving account, and resem-
bles the truthlikeness account and the epistemic account. However, Dellsén’s noetic account sets
itself apart from the truthlikeness account and the epistemic account by taking genuine progress
to consist only in the development of more accurate representations of those aspects of the world
that foster understanding. Thus Dellsén (2016, 78-79) argues that some highly truthlike or known
pieces of information, such as spurious correlations and unsystematic observational data, do
not contribute to scientific progress. Contrariwise, certain idealizations away from complex and
messy pieces of knowledge or truthlike information constitute progress if they help us to (cor-
rectly) explain or predict aspects of the relevant phenomenon, e.g., by flagging causally irrelevant
factors.14
3.2 The framework of the scientific progress debate
Having presented the four main accounts of scientific progress on offer, we will now comment on
various issues, distinctions, and connections that have emerged during the decades inwhich these
accounts have been discussed. These collectively constitute the frameworkwithin which accounts
of scientific progress have been offered and debated. In so doing, we hope to lay the groundwork
for a more constructive and systematic debate about philosophical progress.
According to Niiniluoto (1980, 2019), we should distinguish some basic questions about sci-
entific progress: The conceptual question is concerned with a definition of the term ‘scientific
progress’. The factual question is concerned with whether science actually makes progress. The
methodological (or epistemological) question is concerned with how progress can be identified or
recognized, i.e., what indicates that progress has occurred or will occur. It’s important to keep
these questions apart; but equally important is the fact that answering one in a certain way
may influence how we answer another. In particular, answers to the factual and methodologi-
cal/epistemological questions depend on an answer to the conceptual question. Moreover, the
latter should not be conflated with the methodological/epistemological question, e.g., because
solving problems might epistemologically indicate that we are making progress while not neces-
sarily constituting progress.
The first thing to note about the conceptual question is that the generic term ‘progress’ is partly
evaluative, roughly meaning improvement across time (Niiniluoto, 2019, §2.2). Thus an account of
scientific progress has consequences for how scientific research should be organized and incen-
tivized. For example, to the extent that one’s preferred account of scientific progress counts a
particular research project R1 as more progressive than another such project R2 (because, say, the
former is certain to lead to more truthlike theories being accepted), then—all other things being
equal—scientists should be incentivized to pursue R1 at the expense of R2. According to an alter-
native account, R2 may be more progressive (e.g., because it would provide more understanding
than R1, albeit at the expense of some truthlikeness), in which case proponents of that account
should prefer R2 over R1.
Second, it is important to note that although ‘progress’ is a term for improvement over time,
accounts of scientific progress are notmeant to capture every sense in which science could be said
to improve. For example, although science would improve by being better funded, by adopting
more reliableways to conduct peer review, or by increasing gender equality among scientists, these
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types of improvements are not the subject of the aforementioned accounts of scientific progress.
Niiniluoto (2019, §2.) refers to the type of progress that is at issue in the debate as cognitive progress,
and distinguishes it from methodological, economical, educational, and professional progress in
science. This is not to say that these other forms of progress are unimportant, or less important
than cognitive progress. Rather, the point is just that these forms of scientific progress should be
distinguished for the purposes of the debate between truthlikeness, problem-solving, epistemic,
and noetic accounts of (cognitive) progress.
Third, another useful distinction that has been made in recent discussions is that between con-
stituting and promoting progress (Bird, 2008, 280; Dellsén, 2018a, 73). The four accounts reviewed
in §3.2 are clearly intended as accounts of what constitutes progress. The truthlikeness account, for
example, is best interpreted as holding that increasing truthlikeness is progress. However, there
are many other ways to make valuable contributions to science, even cognitively, e.g., develop-
ing a sophisticated mathematical framework in which a new theory could finally be adequately
formulated. This elementary point would not refute the truthlikeness account since such valu-
able cognitive developments can be classified as promoting increases in truthlikeness—and thus,
according to the truthlikeness account, promoting progress. Although constituting and promoting
progress would thus be closely related, they would be distinct in so far as a progress-promoting
episode would be valuable only to the extent that it leads to—or is likely to lead to—scientific
progress at a later time, whereas a progress-constituting episode would be valuable regardless of
its actual or probable causal effects.
Fourth, another important issue concerns the agent(s) whose psychological or epistemic states
determinewhether progress has occurred (see, e.g., Bird, 2019; Gilbert, 2000; Ross, 2020). For ease
of discussion, consider the epistemic account specifically (analogous issues arise for alternative
accounts).Who (orwhat) is it that must havemore scientific knowledge at t2 than at t1 in order for
scientific progress to occur between t1 and t2 according to this account? It seems insufficient for
progress that some single scientist gains knowledge between t1 and t2.15 After all, other scientists
may simultaneously lose knowledge, leading to an overall reduction in knowledge, especially if
the individual who gains knowledge is isolated and uninfluential. So, while increasing the knowl-
edge of individual scientists will often promote progress, it does not constitute progress. Thus two
main alternatives suggest themselves, viz. (i) that some sufficiently large majority of scientists
must have gained knowledge, or (ii) that the scientific community—considered as an epistemic
agent in its own right capable of mental states or direct analogues thereof—has gained knowl-
edge.16
Fifth, an implicit assumption in debates about scientific progress is that progress is amatter of
degree: there can be more and less progress during a given episode.17 Indeed, for many important
purposes, it is clearly not enough to be able to say whether progress did, or would, occur during
that episode; rather, we want to also know how much progress did, or would, occur. Suppose, for
example, that we are deciding between research projects R1 and R2, where it is universally agreed
that each project would lead to some progress. In that case, an account of scientific progress would
be useless unless it also told us which of the two projects is likely to lead tomore progress (or that
theywould lead to exactly the same amount of progress). This gradability of progress is effortlessly
explained by all extant accounts of scientific progress, since they all define progress in terms of
something that is itself gradable in one way or another. In the case of the epistemic account, for
example, although knowledge of some specific proposition may not itself be a matter of degree, it
is a matter of degree how many propositions are known at a given time.
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3.3 From scientific to philosophical progress
Having presented the four main alternative accounts of scientific progress and the framework
within which they have been proposed and debated, we now consider whether and how these
accounts can be extended into accounts of philosophical progress. In addition to these four
accounts, one can, of course, combine two or more of them into a pluralist account on which
philosophical progress can consist in fundamentally different achievements of the sorts discussed
below. Alternatively, one can draw upon elements from the different accounts in order to develop
a hybrid account (more on this below). (In order to distinguish accounts of philosophical progress
from related accounts of scientific progress, we will use a subscripted ‘P’ in labeling the former.)
Consider first a truthlikeness account𝑃, according to which philosophy progresses between t1
and t2 just in case the philosophical theories accepted at t2 are more truthlike than those accepted
at t1. In order to cover progress in normative areas of philosophy, such as ethics, the notion of
‘truthlikeness’ would have to extend beyond descriptive facts to normative facts, such as the pre-
cise circumstances under which it would be morally wrong to tell a lie (if there are indeed such
normative facts). These normative facts would simply be included in themaximally specific claim
𝐶∗ that accurately captures all facts, and against which a given philosophical theory T—associated
with a disjunction of maximally specific claims (𝐶1 ∨ … ∨ 𝐶𝑛)—would be measured for truthlike-
ness. A theory of when lying is wrong, for example, would be truthlike to the extent that the
disjuncts in its massive disjunction are similar to 𝐶∗, which includes, among other things, a fully
true claim about exactly when lying is wrong.
Like the account of scientific progress from which it draws inspiration, this truthlikeness
account𝑃 does not require that any of the theories accepted at the end of an episode are fully
true, let alone maximally truthlike, for that episode to be progressive. Indeed, the truthlikeness
account𝑃 entails that a less accurate, but more informative, such theory may be more truthlike
than its more accurate counterpart. So, for example, since the theory that lying is sometimes wrong
is less informative than the theory that lying iswrongwhenever analternative course of actionwould
lead to a greater balance of pleasure over pain, the latter theory may well be more truthlike than
the former—even if utilitarianism is false. Put differently, the latter theory may capture more of
the truth than the former, even if the former is true and the latter false. Thus, as per the truth-
likeness account of scientific progress, the truthlikeness account𝑃 implies that coming to accept a
false theory—even a theory that is known for certain to be false—may very well constitute philo-
sophical progress.
This immediately suggests that it is a mistake, at least from the truthlikeness account𝑃’s per-
spective, to infer that accepting ‘failed’ philosophical theories cannot constitute progress. Con-
sider Gettier’s (1963) infamous counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true
belief. Although this ‘tripartite’ theory of knowledge is thus plausibly false, it is also arguably
highly truthlike, especially in comparison to the unreflective view—often found among laypeo-
ple unfamiliarwith the concept of justification—that knowledge is simply true belief.Moreover, at
least some of the views developed in response to Gettier’s counterexamples, e.g., that knowledge is
justified true belief whose truth isn’t due to luck (e.g., Pritchard, 2005; Zagzebski, 1994), are plau-
siblymore truthlike than the original ‘tripartite’ theory.18 Indeed, even if all theories of knowledge
currently in contention are strictly speaking false, a modestly accurate theory of knowledgemight
be highly truthlike since any such theory that aims for full generality will be extremely informa-
tive.
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Next let’s consider a problem-solving account𝑃, according to which philosophy progresses
between t1 and t2 just in case there are fewer (or less important) unsolved philosophical prob-
lems at t2 than at t1. For this account to be analogous to the corresponding account of scientific
progress, a philosophical ‘research tradition’ would have to determine what counts as a ‘problem’,
how ‘important’ a given problem is, and what counts as a ‘solution’ to such a problem. But which
aspects of philosophical practice must be shared by a community of philosophers in order for that
community to constitute such a research tradition? One option is to identify research traditions
with very broad historical schools of thought, such as ‘analytic philosophy’ and ‘continental phi-
losophy’. This seems appropriate in so far as analytic philosophers, for example, are broadly in
agreement on regarding the need to respond to certain philosophical problems, e.g., regarding the
relation of mind to body, the status of moral claims, and the analysis of knowledge.
However, to the extent that analytic philosophers disagree on which problems are most impor-
tant, and on the appropriate methodology for philosophy—determining, amongst other things,
what counts as a genuine solution to any such problem—it is not clear that analytic philosophy is a
suitable candidate for a research tradition. Instead, a ‘research tradition’ may have to be identified
with something more fine-grained, such as philosophical movements like logical positivism, ordi-
nary language philosophy, and experimental philosophy. A potential problem with this suggestion
is that much of philosophy seems to take place entirely outside of any designated philosophical
movement of this kind. In response, one might suggest that we simply lack a name for the largest
such movement within analytic philosophy, but that—inevitably—we are all part of some such
movement since we all implicitly accept certain problems as most important, and certain solu-
tions as genuine, even if we don’t explicitly conceive ourselves as part of the (perhaps unnamed)
movement that shares these assumptions.
One way to resolve the challenge of finding a philosophical counterpart to a scientific research
tradition is to say that the identities of philosophical problems, their importance, andwhat counts
as solving them, is simply determined by the attitudes of an individual philosopher working on
those problems. This way of spelling out the problem-solving account𝑃 would depart rather rad-
ically from the problem-solving account as developed by Kuhn and Laudan, where grounding
these facts in research traditions makes them, if not objective, at least intersubjective. By contrast,
the individualistic version of the problem-solving account𝑃 we are now considering would imply
that philosophical progress is entirely agent-relative, so that what counts as progress for one per-
son will not count as progress for another unless they happen to share the relevant attitudes.
Indeed, someone who has sufficiently lenient standards for what counts as ‘solving’ some set of
philosophical problems could on this view truly say that philosophy has made a lot of progress,
while someone with stricter standards would be saying something false using the exact same
words. Relatedly, according to such an account we would make progress, relative to the stan-
dards of some agent, when that agent simply downgrades the importance of some as-yet-unsolved
problem.
One important upshot of this discussion of the problem-solving account𝑃 is that the notions
of a ‘problem’, its ‘importance’, and a corresponding ‘solution’ are inherently relative to some-
thing or other—be it a broad tradition like analytic philosophy, a somewhat narrower movement
like experimental philosophy, or individual philosophers like you and me. Put somewhat differ-
ently, it makes no sense on the Kuhn- and Laudan-inspired problem-solving account𝑃 that we
have articulated, to say that this or that is an important philosophical problem, or that we have a
solution to the problem, in an absolute sense. Consequently, when the problem-solving account𝑃
appeals to notions like ‘problems’, their ‘importance’, and their ‘solutions’, such notions will
always be relativized towhatever it is that determines theirmeanings, e.g., traditions,movements,
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or individuals. Of course, Kuhn and Laudan were happy to accept this implication for scien-
tific progress—indeed, it is intentionally built into their accounts. It’s doubtful, however, that
philosophers who appeal to philosophy’s ‘solutions’ to ‘big’ ‘problems’ are quite as happy to do so
as well.
Now let’s turn to an epistemic account𝑃, according to which philosophy progresses between
t1 and t2 just in case more philosophical theories are known at t2 than at t1. The most distinc-
tive feature of such an account is that it would require philosophical theories to be justified in
some sense (and perhaps also non-Gettiered) in order for our coming to believe them to consti-
tute progress. This brings to the fore the question of how—and indeed whether—philosophical
theories are epistemically justified. Knock-down philosophical arguments are notoriously rare,19
since when faced with a valid argument for an unpalatable conclusion it is relatively easy to reject
one or more premises. As the saying goes, one person’smodus ponens is another’smodus tollens.
This phenomenon of ‘premise deniability’ (Chalmers, 2015, 18; see also van Inwagen, 2006, 37-55)
is certainly muchmore pervasive in philosophy than in science—even if premises can sometimes
reasonably be rejected in science as well. (While the observational data to which scientific argu-
ments typically appeal can be—and sometimes are—contested, the theories and ’intuitions’ to
which philosophical arguments typically appeal are more easily and frequently contested.) Thus,
while it is an open question whether and to what extent premise deniability undermines justifi-
cation (on a given theory of the latter), proponents of an epistemic account would seem to either
owe us a story of how philosophical theories are justified in spite of premise deniability, or else
submit to the pessimistic conclusion that philosophical progress is relatively rare.
Finally, let’s consider a noetic account𝑃, according to which philosophical progress consists
in increasing understanding of philosophical phenomena—or, perhaps, philosophical aspects of
(possibly non-philosophical) phenomena.20 UsingDellsén’s operational definition of understand-
ing, this would consist in gaining or improving abilities to correctly explain or predict aspects of
the relevant phenomenon. So, for example, philosophical progress would be made with regard
to knowledge to the extent that we succeed in explaining what makes something knowledge,
i.e., what ‘grounds’ knowledge, or in predicting whether a given mental state would constitute
knowledge. As noted, Dellsén (2016, 81) emphasizes that the noetic account allows that increased
understanding—and thus progress—can be achieved via theories and models that include ideal-
izations in so far as they facilitate correct explanation and prediction. A potential example in the
philosophical domain is the extensive idealizations employed in formal epistemology, as when
epistemic agents are modeled as possessing infinitely fine-grained opinions, i.e., credences. Even
though no agents, rational or otherwise, have opinions that are so fine-grained, this idealization
serves various useful purposes as far as understanding is concerned, e.g., in enabling us to explain
how an agent’s rational degree of confidence in a conjunction depends on their confidence in each
of its conjuncts.
Having outlined these philosophical counterparts of the leading accounts of scientific progress,
we emphasize again that our intent is not to argue that one of them must be the correct account
of philosophical progress. As in the case of scientific progress, it is very much an open ques-
tion whether any of the accounts adequately defines progress or whether we need an alterna-
tive account.
Indeed, one obvious type of alternative account is one that combines two or more of the
accounts outlined above into a pluralist (or disjunctive) account. On such an account, multiple
distinct achievements can each constitute philosophical progress. For example, we might make
progress whenwe increase the truthlikeness of accepted theories or increase our understanding of
philosophical phenomena. While this move would introduce its own set of issues, such as how to
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balance one kind of progress against another to determine the degree of progress overall, it would
also encompass a broader range of developments under the banner of progress.
Another type of alternative account would combine elements from different accounts into a
hybrid account of philosophical progress. For example, consider a hybrid of the problem-solving
and truthlikeness accounts𝑃 that emphasizes the role of a research tradition in determining what
counts as a problem (such that solving it would be progressive), while simultaneously measuring
the progress made by a given solution in terms of its truthlikeness. By incorporating machinery
from the truthlikeness account, this hybrid account pursues amore objective approach to evaluat-
ing putative solutions to philosophical problems than the (non-hybrid) problem-solving account𝑃.
At the same time, it does justice to the plausible thought that whether solving a given problem
constitutes progress might be determined by the status attributed to that problem by the philo-
sophical analogue of a research tradition.
Although pluralist or hybrid accounts are alternatives to the four accounts outlined above, their
development also rests squarely on having already outlined the accounts (or elements thereof)
that are to be combined—which is what we hope to have done. More importantly, formulating
these accounts and locating them within a general framework inspired by the debate about sci-
entific progress allows us to draw valuable lessons for advancing the debate about philosophi-
cal progress.
4 LESSONS FOR PHILOSOPHICAL PROGRESS
We are now in a position to distill several important lessons from the preceding discussion con-
cerning recent debates about the nature and prevalence of philosophical progress.
4.1 Crucial distinctions
The first set of lessons returns to the distinctions made in the framework underpinning debates
about scientific progress, which can also provide much-needed clarity and systematicity to the
debate about philosophical progress.
First, drawing on Niiniluoto (1980, 2019), we should note that the factual question about the
existence and prevalence of philosophical progress depends on the conceptual question about the
nature of philosophical progress. It makes little sense to judge whether or not philosophy makes
progress before determining what would be required in order for it to do so. Nevertheless, extant
defenses of pessimism and optimism about philosophical progress, i.e., answers to the factual
question, have largely proceeded without any explicit mention of how to answer the conceptual
question, i.e., which account of philosophical progress is presupposed. Similarly, by keeping sepa-
rate the epistemological question of howwe can recognize philosophical progress from the concep-
tual question of what constitutes philosophical progress, we can see that, for example, collective
convergence or solving a philosophical problem might be merely evidence for progress, and not
constitute it. More generally, taking care to distinguish the different questions about progress will
lead to a more nuanced discussion about philosophical progress.
A second lesson concerns the distinction between progress tout court and degrees of progress.
A given episode may be more or less progressive, so when comparing the progress of philoso-
phy with some benchmark (e.g., the progress of science) it is not enough to point to progressive
episodes or even count the number or proportion of progressive episodes; rather, we must also
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measure the degree to which each episode is progressive. This insight sheds some light on what
Stoljar (2017, 69-70) calls ‘the negativity objection’ to his argument for optimism, viz. that in all of
his proposed solutions to boundary problems, the answers come in the ‘negative’ form of reject-
ing a ‘boundary thesis’ such as ‘If there are facts about meaning, all such facts are necessitated
by behavioral facts’. Stoljar insists that such an answer, despite being quite uninformative and
thus disappointing according to many commentators (e.g., Chalmers, 2015; van Inwagen, 2004),
is still progress.
One promising way forward takes its cue from Stoljar’s suggestion that when it comes to solu-
tions to philosophical problems, “negativity is one thing, size is another” (Stoljar, 2017, 70). This
remark suggests that the dispute about whether ‘negative’ solutions to boundary problems count
as progress can be analyzed using the distinction between progress tout court and degrees of
progress. To wit, while ‘negative’ solutions are progressive tout court, the degree of progress they
provide may (but need not—see below) be small compared to the degree of progress provided
by corresponding ‘positive’ solutions. For example, consider a solution to Quine’s problem of the
indeterminacy of meaning that allowed us to retain the thesis that all facts about meaning are
necessitated by behavioral facts (which would thus provide us with the beginnings of a much-
anticipated theory of meaning). This would arguably constitute more progress than the rejection
of any necessary connection betweenmeaning and behavior (which says nothing about what does
necessitate facts about meaning). According to this analysis, there is a sense in which Stoljar and
his opponents might both be correct, since Stoljar could be right that ‘negative’ solutions are pro-
gressive tout court, while his opponents could be right that these solutions are less progressive
than we might have hoped or expected.
Indeed, this intuitive thought that ‘negative’ solutions may constitute less progress than cor-
responding ‘positive’ ones can be fleshed out with the help of some of the theoretical machinery
from the accounts developed in section §3.3. The way forward is clearest on the truthlikeness
account𝑃, since the notion of truthlikeness, as articulated by, e.g., Niiniluoto (1999) and Oddie
(1986), is explicitly and deliberately designed to imply that the truthlikeness of a theory is a func-
tion not just of the extent to which it reveals nothing but the truth (accuracy) but also of the extent
to which it reveals the whole truth (informativeness). In the above case, the ‘positive’ solution is
clearly more informative than the ‘negative’ one, so on the truthlikeness account𝑃 the ‘positive’
solution would constitute more progress than the corresponding ‘negative’ solution (assuming, in
each case, that the relevant solution is true). With that said, Stoljar (2017, 69-72) is right to point
out that it is not the ‘negativity’ or ‘positivity’ of solutions that determine the extent to which
they are progressive, since a ‘negative’ claim can easily be more informative (and therefore more
truthlike, if true) than a ‘positive’ claim. So the point is not that ‘positive’ solutions necessarily
constitute more progress than ‘negative’ ones. Rather, the lesson here is that we should focus on
how to account for the different degrees of progress made by various solutions, regardless of their
‘positive’ or ‘negative’ framing.
A third lesson is that we should distinguish achievements that promote progress—the value
of which is merely instrumental for future progress—from those constitutive of progress—the
value of which does not depend on (actual or likely) progress at some later time. This distinction
sheds light on the senses in which wemight want to be pluralists about philosophical progress, as
Chalmers (2015, 14) claims to be. Pluralism about what promotes progress is eminently plausible,
since there are clearly many distinct ways of causing or facilitating progress. Likewise, distin-
guishing cognitive progress from other kinds of progress amounts to a kind of pluralism about
philosophical progress, since any account of cognitive progress can be combined with any view
whatsoever regarding other kinds of progress in philosophy (e.g., methodological). It is less clear,
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however, that pluralism about what constitutes cognitive philosophical progress is correct. If there
are many distinct achievements that each constitute progress, how can we compare the extent to
which progress has beenmade through one type of achievement as opposed to another?Andwhat,
exactly, is it in virtue of which all these distinct achievements all constitute progress? So pluralism
about what constitutes progress, although perhaps an initially attractive thought, comes with its
own set of potential problems to which its proponents must respond. The salient alternative is to
be a ‘monist’ about what constitutes cognitive progress but a pluralist about what promotes it, and
also acknowledge a plurality of kinds of philosophical progress that are not cognitive.21
4.2 Convergence and disagreement
A second set of lessons concerns what tomake of the fact that there appears to be less convergence
in philosophy than in science. How, if at all, does this undermine or prevent philosophy from
making progress? Here we draw two related lessons.
The first of these lessons relates to the issue concerning the agent(s) whose changing cognitive
states determine whether an episode counts as progressive. As we noted, it is plausibly not suffi-
cient for scientific progress that a single scientist improves their cognitive attitudes in some way,
e.g., by gaining knowledge or increasing their understanding, since other scientists may undergo
cognitive regression at the same time. The same point applies,mutatis mutandis, to philosophical
progress. It is thus arguably a mistake to suggest, as Frances (2017, 55) and Cappelen (2017, 71-
72) both do in different ways, that a single individual’s improving cognitive attitudes is sufficient
for philosophical progress. More generally, this strongly suggests that philosophical progress, like
scientific progress, should be analyzed and evaluated at the level of communities of inquirers,
perhaps in terms of the proportion who have improved cognitive attitudes of the requisite kind,
or in terms of the collective cognitive attitudes of the community itself.
The other lesson is that the significance of peer disagreement, and the extent to which it under-
mines progress, may vary between the different accounts of philosophical progress. As we have
effectively noted already, it is commonly thought that peer disagreement about philosophical
claims would undermine an individual’s justification for believing them, and consequently pre-
vent them fromhaving knowledge—evenwhen the relevant claims are in fact true and believed.22
Thus, given sufficiently widespread disagreement on a given philosophical question, it seems that
no philosopher would know the answer to the question. In that case, there would clearly not be
a sufficiently high proportion of inquirers who know that answer for there to be community-
level knowledge of the answer; and, at least in typical cases, it would also be a stretch to argue
that the community considered as a collective agent could know the answer when none of its
members do.23 Thus, at first blush, it seems plausible that on the epistemic account𝑃, sufficiently
widespread disagreementwould indeed undermine philosophical progress in a relatively straight-
forward way.
In fact, however, whether there is any straightforward inference from disagreement to lack of
progress depends on exactly how the epistemic account𝑃 is spelled out. In particular, as noted
above, a proponent of the epistemic account may opt for a theory of epistemic justification, or
of knowledge more generally, according to which peer disagreement may not undermine justi-
fication or knowledge.24 A simple version of process reliabilism, for example, might hold that a
belief is justified just in case it is formed as a result of a sufficiently reliable belief-forming pro-
cess. Such a belief might thus remain justified even in the face of peer disagreement, especially if
one’s disagreeing peers happen to have formed their beliefs through an unreliable belief-forming
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process.25 If, by contrast, the epistemic account𝑃 is paired with a typical internalist theory of jus-
tification, then it seems that one’s awareness of peer disagreement would straightforwardly count
as (higher-order) evidence against one’s initial belief and thus undermine one’s justification and
knowledge. In sum, then, whether widespread disagreement undermines progress on the epis-
temic account𝑃 will depend on how one spells out the notion(s) of knowledge and/or justification
to which the account appeals.
In addition, it is noteworthy that these considerations regarding the role of disagreement in
undermining progress do not apply to any of the other three competing accounts of philosoph-
ical progress outlined in §3.3, since none of these accounts impose a justification requirement
on philosophical progress. On the truthlikeness account𝑃, for example, the fact that widespread
disagreement about a philosophical thesis undermines philosophers’ justification for that thesis
does not in any way prevent the acceptance of the thesis from constituting progress.
With that said, however, any account of progress will have to deal with a different issue related
to disagreement, viz. how to determine whether an episode is progressive when only some of the
members of the philosophical community undergo the requisite kind of cognitive improvement.
For example, is there philosophical progress on the truthlikeness account𝑃 when one segment of
the philosophical community adopts a more truthlike theory while another segment adopts a less
truthlike theory? Presumably, the answer to such a question depends on the relative sizes of the
segments (in addition to the extent to which the truthlikeness of the respective theories changes),
but how exactly would it do so? Such questions remain unanswered as of yet, for philosophical
progress as well as for scientific progress.
Regardless of howwe answer such questions, however, it’s clear from the above discussion that
the connection between convergence and progress will be rather more nuanced than it has been
assumed to be thus far. For example, note that on the truthlikeness account𝑃 envisioned above,
philosophical progress might come by way of enlarging the proportions of the community that
accept more truthlike theories. Importantly, then, progress might occur without convergence on
a single answer, and even alongside divergence (i.e., increased disagreement over time). This will
be the case when, for example, a theory T1 that was previously unanimously accepted is chal-
lenged by a more truthlike theory T2 that becomes accepted by a relatively small minority, while
the majority still accepts T1. In that case, a plausible truthlikeness account𝑃 would imply that
there is progress since the average truthlikeness of accepted theories, weighed by the proportion
of advocates, increases over time—even if this is accompanied by increased disagreement within
the philosophical community. (Similarly for other accounts, at least in so far as they do not impose
a justification requirement on philosophical progress.) Given this, it is clearly a mistake, on most
accounts of philosophical progress, to infer directly from the presence of philosophical disagree-
ment (and the lack of convergence) to a lack of philosophical progress.
4.3 Tools to further develop existing accounts
A third set of lessons concerns the ways in which seeing existing proposals about the nature of
philosophical progress through the lens of the accounts formulated in §3.3 helps to reveal potential
refinements and improvements for these proposals. Chalmers’ account, for example, is underde-
veloped in comparison with accounts of scientific progress. Although Chalmers emphasizes that
he is a “pluralist about philosophical progress”, he primarily focuses on one "form" of progress,
viz. “progress towards the truth” (Chalmers, 2015, 14). Chalmers admits sympathy with the view
that progress towards the truth has "a certain primacy among the forms of philosophical progress”
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(Chalmers, 2015, 14), raising questions of whether the other philosophical successes he mentions
(e.g., developing new methods) are best thought of as constituting (rather than promoting) cogni-
tive progress.
Regarding the form of progress that is Chalmers’ primary focus, it’s unclear whether his view is
closer to the epistemic account𝑃 or the truthlikeness account𝑃. Some of Chalmers’ formulations,
e.g., “progress toward the truth is one form of philosophical progress” and “attaining the truth is
the primary aim at least of many parts of philosophy” (Chalmers, 2015, 14) appear to be endorse-
ments of a ‘pluralist’ version of the truthlikeness account𝑃. However, Chalmers also says that
“convergence goes along with increases in knowledge”, and that “agreement is required for [col-
lective] knowledge” (Chalmers, 2015, 14-15), which in turns serves as the backdrop for an extended
discussion of disagreement among philosophers and the extent towhich it undermines philosoph-
ical progress (Chalmers, 2015, 15-16). This emphasis on the importance of collective knowledge for
philosophical progress suggests that Chalmers has something like the epistemic account𝑃 inmind
(cf. Cappelen, 2017, 69-73). As we discussed above, peer disagreement among philosophers may
affect truthlikeness and epistemic accounts𝑃 quite differently, depending on the theory of epis-
temic justification with which the account is paired, so onemust ‘pick a lane’ in order to fruitfully
pursue the questions on which Chalmers focuses.
Our framework also suggests ways in which Stoljar’s (2017) account might be further fleshed
out. In his book-length treatment of the topic, progress is simply defined as answering philosoph-
ical questions or ‘suitably related’ questions. For Stoljar (2017, 11, n7), a philosophical question is
simply a problem, e.g., a ‘boundary problem’ (see §2.2). In this respect, Stoljar’s account resembles
the problem-solving account𝑃. However, Stoljar (2017, 22) also emphasizes that to aim to answer
these questions is to have epistemic aims, and that philosophical progress is epistemic progress.
While Stoljar leaves open which particular types of epistemic achievement (e.g., knowledge, jus-
tified belief, certainty) should be used to characterize the epistemic aim in question, he opts to
focus on knowledge in particular (Stoljar, 2017, 22). To solve a problem, then, is for Stoljar some-
thing like coming to have knowledge of (alternatively: justified belief in, certainty of) the prob-
lem’s solution.
Accordingly, it may be valuable to view Stoljar’s account as—or compare it with—a hybrid of
the problem-solving account𝑃 and the epistemic account𝑃. Such a hybrid account would have in
common with the problem-solving account𝑃 not only the idea that to make progress is to solve
problems, but also the idea that solving problems of different kinds might contribute differently
to progress. At the same time, such an account could make sense of the idea that making philo-
sophical progress is a genuine epistemic achievement by making knowledge accumulation nec-
essary for progress. Conceiving of the account in this way is valuable because it highlights some
resources on which the account might draw in order to deal with potential difficulties and fill in
further details.
To see this, consider some questions which Stoljar’s account leaves unanswered. For exam-
ple, what if the philosophical problem that is presented and subsequently solved is itself deeply
confused, e.g., because it rests on a false presupposition?26 In that case, does answering it still
count as progressive (to the same degree)? Even for non-confused questions, does answering any
such question count as equally progressive? Plausible verdicts on these issues are provided by the
hybrid account suggested above. Such an account can draw upon the epistemic account𝑃 and rule
that whether, and the extent to which, a given answer is progressive depends on whether, and
the extent to which, it adds to what is already known in philosophy. Since deeply confused ques-
tions typically result in false answers, answering them typically does not constitute progress. For
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non-confused questions, some answers will constitute more progress than others depending on
how much knowledge the answers bring us.27
Of course, the fact that Chalmers’ and Stoljar’s views about philosophical progress do not neatly
fit within the framework of accounts outlined in §3.3, and neglect potentially useful resources,
does not show that these views aremistaken.We aren’t arguing that a convincing account of philo-
sophical progress must be a counterpart of one of the existing accounts of scientific progress, or
must draw upon the machinery developed in that context; after all, these accounts could all be
mistaken. Instead, we wish to emphasize two points. First, a comparison of extant views of philo-
sophical progress with those outlined in §3.3 highlights various ways in which the former are in
need of further fleshing out. The comparison is thus productive in that it both prompts defenders
of these views to sharpen their views and arguments, and provides them the resources with which
to do so. Second, since anymeaningful quantitative comparison between the amounts of progress
in science and philosophy requires a common measure of progress, any radical departure from
the accounts of philosophical progress outlined in §3.3 would either require one to give up on
such quantitative comparisons, or commit to a similarly radical departure from extant accounts
of scientific progress. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, it becomes incumbent on those departing from
the accounts of philosophical progress outlined in §3.3, yet still seeking tomake quantitative com-
parisons between the prevalence of scientific and philosophical progress, to formulate and defend
an analogous account of scientific progress.
4.4 The prevalence of philosophical progress
A final set of lessons concerns the prevalence of philosophical progress, i.e., which position on the
pessimism-optimism spectrum is correct. As we have noted, any sensible discussion of whether,
or the extent to which, philosophy makes progress must presuppose some account of the nature
of philosophical progress.With such an account in hand, we can spell out what exactly pessimism
and optimism (of various degrees of darkness and brightness) would amount to in terms that are
transparent to all parties to the debate.
Let’s start by explicitly laying out some of the optimistic and pessimistic positions that can be
framed in terms of these accounts. Given a (non-hybrid, non-pluralistic) truthlikeness account𝑃,
optimism about philosophical progress would roughly amount to the claim that the theories
endorsed by the philosophical community are becoming (much) more truthlike on average, or
that the rate of increase in truthlikeness is roughly equal to or greater than the corresponding
rate in the natural sciences. Pessimism, by contrast, would on the truthlikeness account𝑃 roughly
amount to the claim that the theories endorsed by the philosophical community are not becoming
(much) more truthlike, or that the rate of increase in truthlikeness is (much) less than the corre-
sponding rate in the natural sciences. Analogous formulations will apply to the other accounts of
philosophical progress spelled out above (§3.3), including pluralistic and hybrid accounts.
This has important implications for how the debate between optimists and pessimists ought
to proceed. On the one hand, if and to the extent that the parties to this debate discover that
they agree on an account of philosophical progress—the truthlikeness account𝑃, say—then their
discussions would benefit from debating the issue in terms of whether various past or current
developments did increase or are currently increasing the truthlikeness of accepted philosophical
theories. On the other hand, if and to the extent that the parties to the pessimism-optimism debate
do not agree on an account of philosophical progress, then this disagreement should be made
explicit so as to prevent these parties from talking past each other.Moreover, in that case, optimists
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and pessimists ought to devote at least part of their time debating the merits of their respective
accounts of the nature of philosophical progress, in service of determiningwho is right concerning
the prevalence of such progress.
One might worry, however, that the framework we have developed does not provide an even
playing field in which these debates can be conducted. In particular, one might worry that the
accounts of philosophical progress we have outlined make optimism in one form or another
almost trivially true.28 After all, one might think, don’t all these accounts entail that most or all of
the time, someone will somewhere be making progress by, e.g., solving some problems or slightly
increasing the truthlikeness of their theories? However, even if one answers this question in the
positive, it need not rule out a very dark form of pessimism. Dark pessimists need not subscribe to
what we might call universal pessimism, which holds that on every single topic within the disci-
pline,we are either regressing or ‘flatlining’ (i.e., not progressing or regressing). Rather, theymight
argue for what wemight call net pessimism, according to which the (possibly weighted) balance of
progress and regress across different topics is zero, or even significantly below zero. According to
this type of dark pessimism, there may be progress in some philosophical areas some of the time
but this progress is balanced out or even outweighed by regress elsewhere or at other times, such
that the net effect is that overall there is no net progress, and there may even be net regress.
We take dark net pessimism to be very much a live, and yet disturbing, possibility. It is dis-
turbing because, if shown to be true, it would (arguably) be hard to justify devoting society’s
resources to philosophical research. And it is live because, in contrast to universal pessimism,
even very dark forms of net pessimism cannot be refuted simply by pointing to allegedly uncon-
troversial examples of philosophical progress, such as Lewis’s demonstration that the probability
of a conditional, 𝑃(𝐴 → 𝐵) cannot generally be equated with the corresponding conditional prob-
ability, 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) (Lewis, 1976). Even assuming that this is a case of (some) progress (Cappelen, 2017;
Chalmers, 2015), it would show only that there has been progress on this particular topic, thus
refuting universal pessimism. It would not, by contrast, show that there has been net progress
in philosophy since this development could be outweighed by regress on other topics. To evalu-
ate net pessimism thus requires a kind of holistic perspective on the developments in the entire
discipline, as opposed to a piecemeal approach in which we consider individual developments
in isolation.
Now, one might still have a lingering sense that our approach to philosophical progress, by
drawing upon the framework in which analogous debates about scientific progress take place,
somehow stacks the deck in favor of optimism.After all, accounts of scientific progresswere devel-
oped in order to capture and quantify something that most philosophers of science have assumed
to be pervasive, viz. scientific progress. The worry, then, is that by extending these accounts into
the philosophical domain we bring with us an unwarranted presumption that progress is perva-
sive, thereby excluding pessimism as a possibility from the outset.
However,we don’t see any reason to think thatwhenweutilize themachinery provided by these
accounts we are thereby making any presumption in favor of optimism. On the contrary, since
the accounts of scientific progress from which we have taken our cue were clearly not designed
to entail or suggest any specific position on the pessimism-optimism spectrum about philosophi-
cal progress, our approach is particularly well placed to ensure that we don’t prejudge any issues
regarding the latter. By contrast, had we built accounts of philosophical progress from scratch
based on our prior ideas about what might constitute it, there would have been an inevitable
danger of building into the notion of philosophical progress precisely the activities in which
philosophers commonly engage (e.g., making distinctions, providing counterexamples, raising
questions). Such an approach thus clearly risks stacking the deck heavily in favor of optimism. In
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comparison, our approach in effect uses the debate about scientific progress as a comparatively
neutral ‘testing ground’ for our ideas about cognitive progress in general, which can subsequently
be applied to philosophical progress in particular.29
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
As one would expect, philosophers care deeply about whether their discipline makes progress—
and if so, how much. On the one hand, to discover that philosophy has made no progress, or
very little as compared to other disciplines, is to discover that our efforts have amounted to little
or nothing. Moreover, funding of philosophical research would likely be brought into question.
On the other hand, diagnosing a lack of philosophical progress might catalyse a vital and radical
change in philosophical methodology, e.g., towards incorporating methods from other, more pro-
gressive, disciplines. Given these high stakes, it is perhaps not surprising that most discussions
of philosophical progress are more concerned with arguing for various forms of pessimism and
optimism about philosophical progress than with formulating andmotivating an account of what
philosophical progress would be. And yet it is clear that the question of whether, and to what
extent, philosophy makes progress cannot be sensibly addressed without first offering an account
of what philosophical progress is.
This paper has been an extended attempt to begin to rectify this unfortunate situation. Our aim
has been to formulate several detailed accounts of what philosophical progress might be, along
with a framework of distinctions, concepts, and observations within which these accounts can
be fruitfully understood, compared and evaluated. Motivated by the fact that progress in philos-
ophy is frequently compared to scientific progress, our approach has been to start by examining
the comparatively mature philosophical debate about scientific progress, gleaning from it vari-
ous lessons for the burgeoning debate about philosophical progress, and four detailed accounts
of what philosophical progress would be (from which hybrid and pluralist accounts can also be
built). It is our hope that this offers a more promising way forward for debates about the preva-
lence of philosophical progress.30
ENDNOTES
1 The latter has recently become an important topic in its own right (see, e.g., Cappelen, 2012; Cappelen et al.,
2016; Daly, 2015; Eder et al., 2020; Knobe & Nichols, 2008; Williamson, 2007).
2 See inter alia Bengson et al., 2019; Brock, 2017; Cappelen, 2017; Chalmers, 2015; Frances, 2017; Gutting, 2016;
van Inwagen, 2004; Jones, 2017; Kamber, 2017; McKenzie, 2020; Rapaport, 1982; Rescher, 2014; Russell, 1912;
and Stoljar, 2017. Moody (1986) calls the analogy into question, arguing that philosophy makes progress of a
different kind.
3 These conditions are related in that collective convergence presumably consists in increasing agreement
over time.
4 See Cappelen (2017) for an extended critique of Bourget and Chalmers’ (2014) methodology and of Chalmers’
(2015) leveraging of their results into an argument for pessimism.
5 See also Dietrich, 2011; Shand, 2017; and Slezak, 2018.
6 That peer disagreement undermines justification and therefore knowledge is accepted by many epistemologists
(see, e.g., Christensen, 2007; Christensen & Lackey, 2013; Matheson, 2014), but may be rejected by others, e.g.,
epistemic externalists who eschew internalistic justification requirements on knowledge (see, e.g., Hawthorne
& Srinivasan, 2013; Lasonen-Aarnio, 2014). For a discussion of how disagreement between philosophers in par-
ticular undermines knowledge, see Goldberg, 2013; Beebee, 2018; and Barnett, 2019; although see Kelly, 2016,
375 for a strongly dissenting view.
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7 Tim Maudlin puts the point well in an interview with Scientific American: “It is not that there isn’t
convergence, it is that the outliers who do not converge get much more attention than the great
mass of convergers, who don’t particularly stand out.” (https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/
philosophy-has-made-plenty-of-progress/, accessed: September 11, 2020). Along similar lines, Goldstein (2014,
14) contends that “[p]hilosophical progress is invisible because it is incorporated into our points of view. What
was tortuously secured by complex argument becomes widely shared intuition, so obvious that we forget its
provenance. We don’t see it, because we see with it.” Finally, Stoljar (2017, 73) points out that “Once a distinc-
tion is drawn or a development is made it can seem obvious. But that should not blind us to how unobvious
things were prior to those developments.”
8 For references see footnote 2.
9 Here and in what follows, the term ‘theory’ should be understood broadly so as to include any type of represen-
tational device that is capable of satisfying the conditions a given account of progress lays down; thus, in the
case of the truthlikeness account, a ‘theory’ should be understood so broadly as to include anything that could
be truthlike according one’s definition of truthlikeness.
10 This is Laudan’s terminology; a scientific problem corresponds roughly to a Kuhnian puzzle.
11 Again, this is Laudan’s terminology; a research tradition corresponds roughly to what Kuhn initially called a
paradigm and later came to call an interdisciplinary matrix (Kuhn, 1974).
12 In this respect, Bird’s account resembles the naïve view and seemingly inherits the problem described above
regarding progress from one false theory to another. Bird (2007, 76-78) provides a strategy for dealing with this
problem that co-opts machinery from the truthlikeness account; although Cevolani and Tombolo (2013) and
Niiniluoto (2014) argue that it does not succeed.
13 For defenses of a reductionist account of understanding, see, e.g., Grimm, 2006; Kelp, 2015; Sliwa, 2015, and
Khalifa, 2017. For prominent arguments against such accounts, see, e.g., Elgin, 2007; Kvanvig, 2003; Pritchard,
2009, and Hills, 2015.
14 See Strevens (2008, ch. 8, 2017) for a detailed account of how idealizations provide understanding in this way.
15 On this point, see Rowbottom, 2008.
16 Bird (2010, 2014, 2019) argues for the latter version of the epistemic account; Gilbert (2000) and Ross (2020) give
a more general argument that the scientific community is the agent whose epistemic states determine whether
we make scientific progress.
17 Bird (2007, 84) and Dellsén (2016, 77-78) refer to the amount of progress made over a given period of time as the
‘rate’ of progress.
18 Gutting (2016, 312) compares the failure of the tripartite theory in Gettier cases with the failure of the ideal gas
law 𝑃𝑉 = 𝑛𝑅𝑇 in non-ideal circumstances. In each case we have a theory that, although false, “gives correct
results for almost any case that we are likely to encounter in ordinary life [...] but breaks down when further
variables cannot be ignored.”
19 For an argument to the contrary see Ballantyne, 2014. For a (to our minds compelling) response see Keller, 2015.
20 In a recent discussion of the appropriate methodology for philosophy, Bengson et al. (2019, 182) propose a ‘mea-
sure’ of philosophical progress in terms of ‘theoretical understanding.’ However, Bengson et al.’s measure of
progress differs markedly from Dellsén’s noetic account since they focus on theoretical understanding, whereas
Dellsén focuses on objectual understanding.
21 The distinction between what constitutes and promotes progress might also shed light on the stark divide
between Stoljar’s (2017) focus on answering questions and Justin Weinberg’s suggestion that that “progress
is not mainly in convergence on answers to philosophical questions, but in the creation of the questions
themselves.” (See https://philosopherscocoon.typepad.com/blog/2020/04/has-philosophy-made-progress.html
and http://dailynous.com/2017/08/23/intellectual-achievement-creating-questions/, both accessed: September
11, 2020). There is surely something valuable about coming upwith better philosophical questions, but a respon-
dent equipped with the distinction between promoting and constituting philosophical progress might well sug-
gest that the development of new and better questions merely promotes progress—which explains why Wein-
berg’s suggestion rings true to some extent—but nevertheless does not constitute progress.
22 For references on this point, see footnote 6.
23 To be sure, proponents of sui generis collective knowledge sometimes argue that it is possible for a collective to
know that P even when none of its members know that P. However, these are rare, exceptional cases; moreover,
DELLSÉN et al. 23
it seems plausible that such cases do not arise when a substantial proportion of the members actively disagree
with the alleged attitude of the collective agent.
24 For accounts in this vicinity, see, e.g., Hawthorne & Srinivasan, 2013 and Lasonen-Aarnio, 2014.
25 With that said, one might also suggest that the belief would become unjustified due to the fact that the process
of retaining such a belief in the face of disagreement might be unreliable. Our aim here is not to adjudicate
between these ways of spelling out the implications of a simple process reliabilism for peer disagreement, but
rather to note that proponents of the epistemic account𝑃 have some choices regarding which way to go.
26 Stoljar does begin to answer this question in so far as he requires that boundary problems be “well motivated
from an empirical or philosophical point of view” (Stoljar, 2017, 73), but says nothing about the conditions under
which this will be the case.
27 Although there are difficult questions about how to measure amounts of knowledge, answering such questions
is a task that proponents of the epistemic accountmust undertake with anyway. As alluded to in footnote 12, one
way to do this is to co-opt the mechanism of the truthlikeness account, which is explicitly designed to provide
the verdict that adding a logically stronger theory constitutes more progress than adding a weaker one (see Bird,
2007, 76-78).
28 Of course, this might not be considered a problem by those who take moderate optimism to be very plausible
prima facie. It would count in favor of a framework for discussing philosophical progress, however, if it could
at least explain the attraction of a darkly pessimist position by showing how it would follow from assumptions
that might be widely accepted among pessimists.
29 On the other hand, if one thinks that philosophy is entirely unlike science, one might worry that developing
accounts of philosophical progress inspired by accounts of scientific progress stacks the deck in favor of pes-
simism by falsely presupposing that there is continuity between the disciplines, and as a result erroneously
requiring philosophy to make the same kind of progress that science does—and then criticizing it when it
inevitably fails to do so. To this, we reiterate (a) that we are taking as a working assumption that we can advance
the debate about philosophical progress by looking to the literature on scientific progress, and (b) that without
a unified account across science and philosophy, we cannot meaningfully compare the prevalence of progress
made in each.
30 For insightful and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper, we’re grateful to Sam Baron, Victor
Magnússon, Kristie Miller, John Norton, Robert Smithson, and two anonymous referees for this journal. The
research for this paper was funded by the Icelandic Centre for Research (grant number: 195617-051).
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